Security and compliance standards are currently positioned as gates vendors must pass before work begins: FedRAMP authorization, NIST attestations, state-specific overlays, each documented before a line of production code runs. This structure keeps capable builders out, keeps compliance-document specialists in, and provides less actual security than it appears to, because point-in-time paperwork assessments are weak predictors of operational security. The standards themselves can be out of date the moment they are written.
The alternative: move standards assessment out of the procurement gate and into the authority to operate. Let vendors build and demonstrate in production-like sandboxed environments with synthetic data at low barrier, and require them to prove their security posture in the context of the actual environment before sensitive data is processed. Assessment against real, running systems is both more rigorous and less exclusionary than assessment of documents.
And for genuine robustness, replace point-in-time attestation with the open review mechanism described in C3: before production authorization, solutions are published for nationwide review across accessibility, privacy, security vulnerabilities, and better existing alternatives, with findings triaged publicly. A solution that has survived motivated public scrutiny has passed a stronger test than any standards checklist provides, and the test never goes stale, because the reviewers never stop.
I have drafted this open-review mechanism in the proposed legislation linked below. For FedRAMP specifically (question V-7), reciprocity plus environment-context demonstration would streamline authorization far more effectively than additional baseline harmonization.